Introduction
Examinations of board composition in public companies focus on the absence of women but rarely on the absence of visible minority directors (VMDs). In countries such as Canada, the United States and Australia, where visible minorities contribute significantly to GDP and represent a high growth segment of the population, a question arises as to whether boards should bear some demographic similarity to the society in which the firm operates. In order to understand board composition and its potential impact on a firm's performance, more information is required about the complement of VMDs on boards of directors. This study fills this gap in the literature.
"Diversity" in the corporate context refers to the composition of the board, taking into account individual characteristics of board members, such as gender, race, disability, age and ethnicity. The relative paucity of women on boards has dominated the academic debate (Francoeur et al, 2007; Terhesen et al, 2009; Peterson and Philpot, 2006) with visible minority representation falling a distant second (Brammer et al, 2007) . 2 We begin by questioning this divide in the literature and argue that characteristics other than gender are relevant to the discussion about board diversity. Indeed, the aim of this study is to provide a deeper look at board composition by examining VMDs and subgroups of VMDs. 3 To this end, we analyze board composition and performance of sample firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange as well as visible minorities in the graduating classes of director programs (DPs) in Canada. Our preliminary analysis indicates that the representation of VMDs on boards and in DPs is less than 5.5 percent in both cohorts (and less in the TSX group of companies if six foreign-owned firms are excluded). 4 Certain visible minority groups, including those from South Asia, are more prevalent on public company boards than other visible minority groups, such as Aboriginal peoples. Finally, firms in consumer-based industries (such as financial services) demonstrate a higher propensity than other industries (such as mining) to place VMDs on their boards.
We believe that additional attention should be paid to potential contributions that VMDs can make to corporate boards. Building on Becker (1957) , we hypothesize that VMDs may bring specific advantages to the firm and as a result firms will be at a competitive disadvantage if firms fail to hire these directors. Specifically, VMDs may have a unique ability to understand diverse labour and consumer markets, to provide access to untapped and new networks, and to exercise useful approaches in negotiations around the boardroom table.
Our data is useful for lawmakers who are currently considering the question of board diversity, including whether to compel boards to appoint a minimum number of women to the board. In this regard, we note that some countries (such as Norway, Germany, France, Iceland and Spain) have implemented mandatory gender but not visible minority quotas, which may simply be because visible minorities constitute a very small percentage of the overall professional cadres in these countries. Other jurisdictions have implemented a less strict approach. For example, nine Canadian provinces recently adopted a "comply and explain" approach under which public corporations must disclose whether they have a written policy relating to the nomination of women directors, whether they have targets for getting more women on their boards and measures taken to ensure that the policy has been effectively implemented. If the corporation does not consider the representation of women on the board in its nominating process, or has not adopted a target, it must disclose its reasons for not doing so. Philpot, 2006) . The number of public companies with no women board members was about 50 percent. By industry, firms in the mining and oil and gas sectors had just 7 percent of women on their boards while utilities had 23.2 percent (Catalyst, 2014; see also Arfken et al, 2004) . Our efforts are complementary to this research in that we seek to provide data on the numbers of VMDs as well as the types of companies that are more or less likely to have VMDs. We also examine the issue of the relationship between firm's performance and board composition and find that firms with boards comprised of only white males do not perform significantly better than firms with VMDs and females on their boards. We believe that the current policy discussion regarding board composition will be better informed with empirical data such as that which forms the basis of this paper.
After this introduction in Part 1, we set forth our motivation and examine the literature in Part 2. We focus on the contributions that VMDs can make to the board, include opening the corporation up to broader client or customer networks. We then describe our hypotheses and methodology in Part 3 before turning to the results and analysis of the data in Part 4. We conclude the discussion in Part 5 with suggestions for future research. We note at the outset that our primary motivation is to respond to the descriptive question of the complement of VMDs on corporate boards. We do not address the normative question of whether companies should, from an ethical standpoint, increase the number of VMDs on their board, though our study has implications in this regard. To our knowledge, there is no academic research on the presence of VMDs on Canadian public company boards or on the relationship between VMDs and firm performance, which is a gap that this study assists in filling.
Motivation and Background
Historically, the term "corporate governance" has not included a discussion of whether certain sectors of society are represented on a firm's board of directors. Following the fall of Enron in 2001, board composition was central to countries' reform agendas but primarily in terms of the ratio of independent to non-independent or inside directors. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires U.S. public companies to have a majority of independent directors on the audit committee. 6 Both NYSE and NASDAQ require that a majority of the board of directors of a listed company be independent. 7 Similarly, Canadian securities regulators recommended a majority of independent directors on the board, audit and nominating committees and an explanation from the public corporation if it does not adopt these recommended best practices. 8 In the last ten years, however, "corporate governance" has come to include discussions about "diversity" on the board (Dhir, 2014) .
The term "diversity" in this context typically refers to the board's gender complement (van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; Konrad et al, 2006; Sealy et al, 2009 ). But there is some literature in the area of "ethnic diversity," a term that refers to the number of visible minorities or people of colour in the boardroom (Fairfax, 2011; Rhode and Packel, 2014) . The literature focuses on the business case for increasing diversity on boards. One strand of this case has revolved around the claim that in some measure it is in the corporation's interest to ensure that diversity will "improve organizational processes and performance" (Rhode and Packel at 368), including: the time taken to reach decisions; the generation of new ideas; the ability of companies to attract new talent; and the development of diverse networks which in turn improve the board's access to expertise and other business contacts (Dhir, 2010; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013 A second strand of the business case for diversity is tied to empirical data relating to board diversity and firm performance. These studies examine the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. Carter et al (2010) find no statistically significant relationship between gender and financial performance for a sample of major U.S.
corporations. By contrast, Catalyst tracked Fortune 500 companies between 2004 and 2008 and found that companies with the most female directors outperformed those with the fewest, yielding a 26 percent higher return on invested capital and a 16 percent higher return on sales (Catalyst, 2011). 9 Financial benefits linked to having women on boards were more pronounced in the post-2008 period than in the prior three years (Credit Suisse, 2012).
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These results support earlier findings by Erhardt et al (2003) , who argue on the basis of boards for 127 large U.S. companies that diversity is positively associated with firm
performance. Yet the empirical results are mixed, leading some to assert that the empirical evidence regarding board diversity and firm performance is inconclusive (Fairfax, 2013; Rhode, 2014) . Carter et al (2010) argue that board diversity and firm financial performance are endogenous, a point that we acknowledge and discuss below. But we pursue the performance question because it is at least relevant to understanding the motivations of firms in terms of populating their boards. If VMDs enhance the firm's operational performance, the failure to appoint them to the board would result in a competitive disadvantage relative to other firms in the industry (Becker, 1957) . Effectively the firm, which speaks through the board and its nominating process, would be refusing to appoint VMDs even though VMDs may enhance value. The board would be imposing a cost on the firm and its shareholders in the amount of what Becker calls the 'discrimination coefficient,' which in this context would essentially be the loss of value a firm is willing to bear to indulge its taste for discriminating against VMDs.
Discriminating firms will fail to hire VMDs who are as productive, and in fact even more productive, than non-VMDs directors. Given the empirical results we discuss below (that is, that firms with VMDs are performing at least as well as firms with boards comprised of white males only), firms may be able to enhance value, or at least would be at no competitive disadvantage, if they appointed VMDs.
We note that qualitative research suggests that boards themselves are divided in terms of whether board diversity is positive. After conducting 57 interviews with corporate directors, institutional investors and others, Krawiec et al (2013) provide evidence of tensions in boards' views of diversity. For example, while most directors in their study favoured diversity of viewpoints, they also indicate the importance of collegiality. 11 Nevertheless, building on the above-noted notions about incentives to include VMDs on boards, we explore the complement of visible minorities in DPs and corporate boards and also test whether there is any correlation between VMDs and corporate performance. Specifically, we probe the composition of boards and performance of companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and courses that offer education and training for directors and potential directors.
Methodology
We seek to measure the proportions of VMDs on corporate boards in Canada and the pool of candidates graduating from director programs. With hand-collected data, we analyze biographical profiles of both DP graduates and board members of TSX-listed firms.
Consistent with other studies (Grosvold et al, 2007 and Bernardi et al, 2005) , we determine individuals' ethncity by examining pictures available on the DP and company websites. For data on financial performance, we use the Bloomberg database.
We began by examining the pool of candidates in DPs over the past 10 years. We pulled lists 14 In addition to visible minority status, we collected information on the VMD's gender and the industry of the company in which he or she serves as a board member (see Appendix B for a list of industries).
We understand that this methodology, and in particular the use of pictures for classification purposes, can result in undercounting as individuals who are visible minorities may not be classified as such. The approach may also lead to overcounting, though this seems less likely
If an individual's ethnicity were difficult to identify, we researched the etymology of the individual's name (first surname and then given names) and the likelihood of that name belonging to a given minority group. 15 For example, we searched last name and ethnic origin on Google, scanned the top 10-20 Google hits for an indication as to which visible minority group a name likely belongs, and then used that minority group as the individual identifier.
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Of the 357 companies for which data were collected, six were highlighted as being special due to abnormally high proportions of VMDs. 17 On further investigation, we found that these firms were all "foreign owned." The abnormal instances were then verified as noncoincidental by searching for the companies' major shareholders and comparing the ethnicity of these shareholders with the ethnicity of the VMDs. In all cases except one, we found that ownership of the firm was concentrated among those with the same ethnicity (Chinese and, in one case, Latin American) as those VMDs that appeared in abnormal proportions. In the 14 We could not easily find data on all companies in the TSX Composite Index. However, we believe that the 219 companies are representative of the Index and respective industry sectors. 15 Whenever there was ambiguity regarding the ethnicity or a director, we proceeded to perform the name etymology search to reduce subjectivity in coding individual directors. 16 In case of ambiguity in the ethnicity of a name, we coded the director according to the ethnicity most often associated with that name in the Google search results. 
Results and Analysis
We present the summary statistics for the DPs before turning to examine board composition of firms on the TSX. We also sought to test the claim that larger boards are more likely to have more women and VMDs (Carter et al, 2003) . Initially, we found that there is, generally speaking, a higher proportion of visible minorities and women on larger boards than smaller boards as indicated in the table below. But when we expanded our dataset, this proposition no longer held true. That is, the number of visible minorities and women on the board did not increase in lock step with board size. Finally, we conducted an industry-based analysis and in particular, analyzed whether firms in certain industries have more (or fewer) visible minorities on their boards. Most striking about our data is the very high proportion of white males on boards across all sectors. Firms in the financial industry, such as banks, have more women but not VMDs on their boards.
Firms in the basic materials sector have the most VMDs (and these VMDs are male). As discussed above, one strand of the literature relating to board diversity focuses on firm performance. The literature is somewhat mixed. That is, taken together the studies suggest no definitive causal relationship between board composition and firm performance has been found to exist (see Rhode and Packel, 2014) . The inconclusive results are consistent with other corporate governance studies that tend to find no causal relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, such as independent directors on the board, and a firm's performance (Anand, 2013) . Nevertheless, it is important to take the somewhat descriptive analysis provided here to bear on the question of firm performance to see if any conclusions, even if tentative, can be drawn about the importance of VMDs from this perspective.
Thus, in this section, we analyze the average and median performance of companies in each of four groups. We examine firms with boards comprised of: white males only; white males and white females but no VMDs; no females but VMD males; and white females and VMDs (male or female). The latter two boards also had white males on them. We undertook our analysis using four measures: Return on Equity ( Overall, boards with white males and white females performed the best while boards with only white males performed the worst. Boards with both VMDs and females performed better than boards with male VMDs and no females. 21 Specifically, as noted in the chart below, boards that were entirely comprised of white males delivered the poorest ROEs over the period (-16 .2 percent) and also delivered relatively poor ROAs (-7.9 percent). TSRs (12.43 percent) were weaker than other groups indicating a relatively reasonable stock market performance. Unsurprisingly, the overall performance on the ROE and ROA 20 We exclude the six foreign-owned firms in this section. Also note that these financial metrics evaluate financial performance of firms using accounting data (ROA and ROE) and stock market data (TSR and M/B) and are routinely used in the finance literature. 21 It should be noted that we make no conclusion about either the correlation or the causality between diversity and performance.
measures is negative, which may be more representative of the time period under consideration when the entire world economy faced a recessionary period. VMDs but no females is also poor with ROE at -0.02 percent and ROA at -0.11 percent.
Boards with both VMDs and females are next from the accounting metrics perspective; however, the stock market performance was not stellar. Since results based on averages may be influenced by outliers within each sub group, the results below are based on the median values that remove the influence of the outliers. Although the numbers using averages versus median are different, the conclusions are the same. Overall, boards with white females performed the best, followed by boards where both females and VMDs are present. Companies with boards with only white males performed the worst in our sample.
iii) Relative Average Performance (sector adjusted)
Since firms in our overall sample are comprised of many sectors, and board compositions differ across sectors, the results based on overall averages and medians as shown above may be impacted by these sectoral differences. Therefore, we focus on the performance of individual companies relative to the performance of all companies in their own sector. To account for these possible sectoral differences, we calculate the relative performance of each firm on all metrics by dividing their own performance by the average of all companies in their sector. We call this ratio "relative" performance; these results are shown below. A number greater (smaller) than 1 implies that the performance of companies in that sub group is better (worse) after taking into account the sectoral composition.
As can be seen in the charts below this normalisation of performance to take into account sectoral differences shows somewhat different results. Boards with white males only performed better than their sector peers from an accounting standpoint (ROE = 1.37; ROA = 1.93); however, these companies were the poorest performers on the stock market (TSR = 0.52) and only made par in terms of value creation (M/B = 0.99). VMDs and females had poor accounting performance but were not as poor from a stock market perspective. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that firms with boards comprised of only white males demonstrate significantly higher and consistent absolute or relative performance on all performance metrics.
Conclusions
In this study, we examine the complement of VMDs on boards of companies listed on the TSX. We find that the proportion of VMD is less than 5 percent of the sample with some visible minority groups completely unrepresented (Filipinos, West Asians and Aboriginals). Our results related to the financial performance of companies in four subgroups indicate that companies with only white males actually have inferior stock market performance than companies with more diverse boards based both on absolute and "relative to the sector" basis. We also find that firms with boards with only white males do not show significantly better performance than firms with boards comprised of females and VMDs. We do not claim that these results show causality since it is possible that firms that demonstrate superior stock performance are forward-thinking or better able to conduct searches that lead to a diverse board. However, if nothing else, our results do show that there is no performance deterioration by having a diverse board.
We see at least three avenues for further research. First, we plan to investigate that acceptance to application ratios of various DP programs. There are two possibilities: either both VMs and females do not apply in large numbers to these programs or, the acceptance-to-applicant ratio is much lower for these two groups. Second, we plan to track the evolution of the DP graduates' post-graduation state: how many of the VM and female graduates actually find positions on the boards of for profit companies, whether they are private or are publicly listed, and whether these firms happen to be owned by their families and relatives. Third, we aim to contact females and VMDs in our sample and investigate in a systematic way their perception about the degree of their contributions and the reasons as to why companies may have chosen to have them to be members of their boards.
The ICD admissions requirements are the most stringent of the three DPs, followed by comparable requirements for the CAS and the DC. Though there is some variation in admissions criteria, the admissions requirements for DPs are comparable across the three major programs. Of particular note is the consistent requirement for past experience.
